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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
REAL PROPERTY-LEASES-COVENANT OF CONTINUING LIA-
BILITY.-The plaintiff leased certain premises to defendant for five
years, at $2,700 for the first year and $3,000 a year for the re-
mainder of the term. The lease contained the following clause:
"Any entry or re-entry by the landlord, whether had or taken under
what are known generally as summary proceedings, or otherwise,
and in any manner, shall net be deemed to have absolved or dis-
charged the tenant from any liability hereunder." . After thirteen
months, the defendant was ejected by summary proceedings for
non-payment of rent. For eleven months thereafter, the plaintiff
was unable to sublet the premises, for which he asked judgment for
$2,700, with interest. A second cause of action, citing a subletting
for the next three years to a third party, asked judgment for $900,
the difference between the rent agreed to be paid by the defendant
and the new rent. Held, plaintiff was entitled to full judgment
under the clause in the lease continuing the liability of the defen-
dant even after removal by summary proceedings. International
Publications, Inc. v. Matchabelli, 260 N. Y. 451, 184 N. E. 51
(1933).
It has been laid down as a general rule of law that the evic-
tion of a tenant by summary proceedings terminates the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant, so that the former may not recover
subsequent ifnstallments as rent.' Our Civil Practice Act 2 states
that, "The issuing of a warrant for the removal of a tenant from
demised premises cancels the agreement for the use of the prem-
ises, if any, and annuls accordingly the relation of landlord and
tenant, * * *." However, this rule does not militate against the
validity of agreements made by landlord and tenant, continuing the
liability of the tenant for periods subsequent to such eviction.3 Such
a clause has been held not to be contrary to public policy 4 but
simply takes the lease out of the general rule that liability ceases
with the end of the tenant's estate. 5 "The parties may, however,
as they did in this case, agree to the contrary and render the lessee
liable to the end of the term although out of possession." 6 Of
course, the recovery in each case is to be limited to the actual loss
suffered by the landlord through the default of the tenant,7 and the
landlord is duty bound to make every reasonable effort to re-let
" Cornwell v. Sanford, 222 N. Y. 248, 118 N. E. 620 (1918); Hoffman
Brewing Co. v. Wuttge, 234 N. Y. 469, 138 N. E. 411 (1923).
-N. Y. CivIL PRAcnCE AcT. §1434.
'Mann v. Munch Brewery, 225 N. Y. 189, 121 N. E. 746 (1919) ; Baylies
v. Ingram, 84 App. Div. 360, 82 N. Y. Supp. 891 (1st Dept. 1903), aff'd, 181
N. Y. 518, 73 N. E. 1119 (1905).
' Slater v. Von Chorus, 120 App. Div. 16, 104 N. Y. Supp. 996 (1st Dept.
1907).
Mann v. Munch Brewery, supra note 3.0Ibid., Crane J., at 194, 121 N. E. at 747.
'Hall v. Gould, 13 N. Y. 127 (1855); Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N. Y.
333, 162 N. E. 97 (1928).
RECENT DECISIONS
the vacated premises.8 In all these cases, although the lease has
been terminated, the covenant of continuing liability is held to be
distinct from the relationship of landlord and tenant and so sur-
vives the annulment of that relationship. 9 In the instant case, it
was immaterial whether the recovery be termed damages 10 or rents.
since all payments were past due at the inception of the action.1
M.M.
REAL PROPERTY-PRIVATE WATER COMPANIES-PAYMENT OF
PRIOR ACCRUED CHARGES UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST RECEIVER IN
FoRECLosuR1.-Plaintiff, by virtue of a provision in a mortgage au-
thorizing it, upon default in payment, to collect the rents, procured
the appointihent of a receiver during the pendency of the foreclo-
sure sale. Prior to the appointment water charges accumulated by
the mortgagor were not discharged. A private water company or-
ganized pursuant to C. 737 of the Laws of 1873 made application
for an order granting it permission to turn off the water unless
the mortgagor's bill was paid. Held, the company had no lien;
and no right to discontinue the water supply for arrears not in-
curred by the receiver. Title G. & T. Co. v. 457 Schenectady Ave.,
260 N. Y. 119, 183 N. E. 198 (1932).
A private water company is under a public duty to furnish water
to all consumers who may require it and comply with its reasonable
rules.' Reasonable regulations include the right to shut off water
supplied to delinquents and to demand charges for a reasonable time
in advance.2 Default in payment, however, does not give the com-
pany an absolute right to discontinue the supply. Its rights are
to be determined by a competent court.3The supplying of water is a sale.4  A private water company
does not have a lien by statute 5 for water charges as is the case
Supra note 4.
'Roe v. Conway, 74 N. Y. 201 (1878) ; Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381,
62 N. E. 425 (1902).
" See Hermitage Co. v. Levine, supra note 7, for "damage" clauses and the
difficulty encountered there.
"Instant case, at 454, 184 N. E. at 52.
1 City of New York v. Jamaica Water Supply Co., 181 App. Div. 49, 167
N. Y. Supp. 763 (2d Dept. 1917), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 572, 123 N. E. 859 (1919).
1 Millville Improvement Co. v. Millville Water Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 480, 113
Atl. 516 (1921) ; supra note 1.
'McEntee v. Kingston Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27, 58 N. E. 785 (1900) ; Pond
v. New Rochelle Water Co., 143 App. Div. 69, 127 N. Y. Supp. 582 (2d Dept.
1911), aff'd, 206 N. Y. 719, 100 N. E. 1132 (1912); supra note 1.
'Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (1920);
N. Y. PERso-TAL PROPERTY LAW (1909) §156, subd. 1.
C. 737 of the Laws of 1873 and amendments. (Courts should not permit
water to be turned off. It may be an easy method of collecting debts but a
patron who did not purchase the water should not suffer for company's negli-
gence by not demanding charge in advance.)
